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THE SOCIETY OF LEGAL SCHOLARS INTERNATIONAL LAW SECTION AND THE 
THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
Eighteenth Conference on Theory and International Law 
The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
 
Fragmentation, lex specialis and the tensions in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights 
Bill Bowring, Birkbeck College 
 
Introduction 
This paper sketches what is in all probability a heretical view, developing arguments to be found 
in my book (2008)1, and in my chapter in the collection edited by Phil Shiner and Andrew 
Williams2. As in those chapters, I draw on my own experience taking Kurdish (from 1994 to 
1999) and then Chechen (from 2000 to the present) cases to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). What I now attempt is to radicalise those arguments, on the basis of the 
materialist and historicised account of international law and human rights for which I contend. 
In short, I argue that the lex specialis doctrine as developed in particular by the International 
Court of Justice, in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons3 and 2004 Wall4 Advisory Opinions, and the 
2005 DRC v Uganda5 case is an example of a category error, so far as it brings human rights 
law (IHR) and humanitarian law (IHL) into a relationship with each other, for example that
“complementarity”. Chalk is being compared with or even substituted by cheese. Or still worse,  
the two are being mixed together: chalky cheese is horribly indigestible, while cheesy chalk is 
no good at all for writing on blackboards 
 of 
                                                
I start with what I consider to be the manifest confusion of the ICJ. I then turn to the concept of 
“fragmentation of international law” as it impacts on the issue of the relationship of IHR to IHL; 
and the pay close attention to the purported maxim lex specialis derogat lege generali, around 
 
1 B Bowring The Degradation Of The International Legal Order?: The Rehabilitation Of Law And The Possibility 
Of Politics (Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2008) (Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 2008), Chapter 4, “After 
Iraq: International Law in Crisis”, pp.69-98 
2 B Bowring “How will the European Court of Human Rights deal with the UK in Iraq? Lessons from Turkey and 
Russia” in Phil Shiner and Andrew Williams (eds) The Iraq War and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing) 
pp.285-312 
3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, 1996 I.C.J. (July 8) at para 25 
4 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 
(July 9) at para 106; 
5 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec 19), at 
paras 216-217 
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which there now appears to be a consensus of sorts. Third, I outline what are for me the key 
differences between IHL and IHR. Finally, I illustrate my position in contrast to a number of 
contemporary scholars: Schabas, Droege, Hampson, Abresch, Quenivet, and Orakhelashvili. My 
conclusion is that the European Court of Human Rights has in this matter at least, consciously or 
not, chosen the correct path in dealing with cases which have come before it, especially the 
Chechen cases.  
The confusion of the ICJ 
Perhaps the most glaring example of the ICJ’s confusion is to be found in the following well-
known passage from the Wall case: 
106. More generally, the Court considers that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not 
cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found 
in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship 
between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: 
some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively 
matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law. In 
order to answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law. 
I agree with the ICJ that human rights obligations do not cease in the case of armed conflict, 
whether international or internal, save where there has been a formal derogation under Article 4 
of the ICCPR or Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ICJ’s 
error lies, I contend, in treating IHR and IHL as commensurable “branches of international law”. 
This passage has given rise to varying interpretations. In her 2005 study for the UN Sub-
Commission, Françoise Hampson6 commented that this passage makes it “clear that lex 
specialis is not being used to displace [human rights law]. It is rather an indication that human 
rights bodies should interpret a human rights norm in the light of [the law of armed conflict].” 
With all due deference to her, this is to compound the category error. She may well agree with
Noam Lubell, who notices that IHL and IHR appear to be quite different languages: teaching 
IHL to human rights professionals or discussing human rights law to military personnel can 




                                                
7 But interpreting Dutch in the light of
Chinese might prove a fruitless op
Fragmentation and the Chechen cases 
 
6 F Hampson and I Salama ‘Working paper on the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law’ 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53rd session, 
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, 21 June 2005 
7 N Lubell, ‘Challenges in applying human rights law to armed conflict’ (2005) 87:860 International Review of the 
Red Cross 737-754, at 744. 
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For the same reasons, it is, I contend, wrong to describe the tension between IHL and IHR as a 
case of fragmentation. There is no unity there in the first place to be fragmented. And in a recent 
analysis of trends in the politics of international law, Martti Koskenniemi has described the 
alleged fragmentation in the following terms: 
Recent debates of global governance and especially international law’s fragmentation have well 
demonstrated the emergence and operation of structural bias. Through specialization – that is to say, 
through the creation of special regimes of knowledge and expertise in areas such as ‘ trade law ’ , ‘ human 
rights law ’ , ‘ environmental law ’ , ‘ security law ’ , ‘ international criminal law ’ , ‘ European law ’ , and 
so on – the world of legal practice is being sliced up in institutional projects that cater for special 
audiences with special interests and special ethos. The point of creating such specialized institutions is 
precisely to affect the outcomes that are being produced in the international world. Very little is fully 
random out there, as practising lawyers know very well, directing their affairs to those institutions where 
they can expect to receive the most sympathetic hearing.8 
It is most certainly true that practitioners decide on the best tribunal for their clients in the way 
Koskenniemi describes. Prior to the public hearing at the ECtHR of the first six Chechen cases 
against Russia9, the applicants’ lawyers argued between themselves as to whether it would assist 
their clients, the victims of gross violations of the right to life and other ECHR rights, to refer to 
or to rely upon the jurisprudence of the International Criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). They decided – rightly – not to.  
I explain in detail below why I think there are such profound differences between IHL and IHR, 
and why treating IHR and IHL simply as two branches of the law like any others, for example 
contract law or criminal law, is mistaken. 
Lex specialis 
The question arises whether the applicants ought – or were in some way required - to have 
argued IHL. I contend that this question is based on greater confusion still: thatvis, with regard 
to the supposed lex specialis doctrine.   
Martti Koskenniemi, in his Report for the International Law Commission10, analysed the “two 
ways in which law may take account of the relationship of a particular rule to general one.”11 In 
                                                 
8 M Koskenniemi “The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later” v.20 n.1 (2009) European Journal of 
International Law 7-19, at p.9  
9 These were: the bombing of the civilian refugee column in October 1999: Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v 
Russia, (App nos 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00); the massacre in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny: 
Khashiev and Akayeva v Russia (App nos 57942/00 and  57945/00; and the indiscriminate bombing of the village 
of Katyr-Yurt in February 2000: Isayeva v Russia (App no 57950/00). Judgments of 24 February 2005 
10 M Koskenniemi Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of 
international law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (2007) Helsinki: The Eric 
Castren Institute Research Reports 21/2007; and (2006) International Law Commission  A/CN.4/L.682, of 4 April 
2006, at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement 
11 Koskenniemi (2007) ibid, para 88, p.49 
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his view, the application of a genuine lex specialis would be the case of a modification, 
overruling or setting aside of the general rule. He referred to the Commentary to Article 55 of 
the draft articles on responsibility of States for international wrongful acts, which explained that: 
“ (4) For the lex specialis principle to apply it is not enough that the same subject matter is dealt with by 
two provisions: there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernable intention that 
one provision is to exclude the other.”12 
However, referring to the Neumeister case13 he asserted that lex specialis will be applicable 
even in the absence of direct conflict between two provisions, where it might be said that both 
apply concurrently.14  
                                                
He asked: 
“Or what to say of the place of lex specialis in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case 
(1996)? Here the ICJ observed that both human rights law (namely the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) and the laws of armed conflict both applied “in times of war”. Nevertheless, when it came 
to determine what was an “arbitrary deprivation of life” under Article 6 (1) of the Covenant, this fell “to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely the law applicable to armed conflict”.15 In this respect, 
the two fields of law applied concurrently, or within each other. From another perspective, however, the 
law of armed conflict - and in particular its more relaxed standard of killing - set aside whatever standard 
might have been provided under the practice of the Covenant.” 
His conclusion was that the maxim lex specialis derogat lege generali refers to a “standard 
technique of legal reasoning… its power is entirely dependant on the normative considerations 
for which it provides articulation: sensitivity to context, capacity to reflect State will, 
concreteness, clarity, definiteness.” It follows that the maxim “cannot be meaningfully 
codified.” It follows, and I agree with him, that there can be no question of compulsion. 
Some differences between IHL and IHR 
At the most superficial level IHL and IHR have much in common. Both are bodies of law 
ratified by states and binding on states. In both cases there are large multilateral treaties, ratified 
by most states. But there the similarity ends. 
I start by pointing out some significant differences between the law of armed conflict and 
humanitarian law. 
The first relates to history. 
 
12 J. Crawford The International Law Commission’s articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.307 
13 Neumeister v Austria Judgment of 7 May 1974, ECHR Series A (1974) No.17, p.13, para 29 
14 Koskenniemi (2007) ibid para 91, p.50-1 
15 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 p. 240, para. 25. 
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IHL is far older than IHR. It is to be found at the beginning of recorded history, on the earliest 
recorded interactions between polities.16 IHR on the other hand did not exist in any form before 
the 18th century, in the declaration and bills of the French and American Revolutions.17 Even 
then, it formed part of domestic, constitutional law rather than international law, and was only 
emerged in international law after World War I. 
The second concerns the character of the normative structures themselves. IHL is, I assert, 
intrinsically conservative, taking armed conflict as a given, as indeed it always has been in 
human society. Prior to the Red Cross codification, IHL was known as “the laws and customs of 
war”. There is on the other hand no such pre-history for IHR, which is in principle and has 
always been revolutionary, scandalous in its inception, inspired by collective action and 
struggle, and threatening to the existing state order. 18 
The third follows from the second, and relates to the nature of the redress provided. Breaches of 
IHL call for action by one state against another, as in the DRC v Uganda case19; or, as with the 
Geneva Conventions, punishment of “grave breaches” carried out by individuals. The 
individuals concerned must be investigated and prosecuted by states, or more recently by bodies 
created by states, through the agency of the Security Council or treaty bodies. In either case, the 
actor seeking redress is the state or its surrogate. The victim has no standing as such. Despite 
having been established by private actors, the International Committee of the Red Cross is a 
mediator between states, or, as in Additional Protocol II, non-state actors with the capacity to 
control territory. I emphasise that while by virtue of the Geneva Conventions states bind 
themselves to “respect and ensure respect” for the conventions, the mechanism of enforcement 
is primarily that of international criminal law. 
IHR is the diametrical opposite. It is the province of individual complaint, before the Second 
World War to national courts, and following WW II to treaty bodies and mechanisms in which 
states, and not individuals, are brought to account. However it must be emphasised that the 
initial claimants of first generation rights were the revolutionary movements against absolutism 
in the 18th century; those of the second generations were typically trade unions and other social 
                                                 
16 See for example J Ober “Classical Greek Times” in M Howard, G. Adreopoulos and M Shulman (1994) The 
Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, Yale University Press), pp.12-26 
17 In this I concur with Alastair MacIntyre in his After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nded, London: Duckworth, 
1990 (1985)) 
18 See B Bowring (2008) ibid, Chapter 6 “A substantive account of human rights” pp.111-118; and B Bowring 
“Misunderstanding MacIntyre on Human Rights” in Kelvin Knight and Paul Blackledge (eds) Revolutionary 
Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia, special issue of Analyse & Kritik, (2008), v.30 n.1 pp.205-214; and 
also published under the same title (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2008); B Bowring pp.205-214; and response to this 
chapter by MacIntyre at pp.272-3 
19 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec 19) 
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movements, whose struggles attained legal recognition with the creation of the International 
Labour Organisation in 1919. And those of the third generation were, as is well known, peoples, 
notably colonised peoples fighting for their independence. The first and most important of the 
rights of the third generation is the right of peoples to self-determination, finally recognised in 
common Article 1 of the 1966 International Covenants on human rights.20 
It is at this point IHL has been profoundly marked by developments in IHR. The anti-colonial 
struggles were largely aimed at securing independence within defined, overseas, territories – 
that is, the so-called ‘salt-water self-determination’, in respect of territories separated from the 
colonial metropolis by seas and oceans, the territories to which the UN declaration of 1960 was 
directed.21 The non-state protagonists were the ‘national liberation movements’.22   That was the 
period, up to the collapse of the USSR, when the use of force by self-determination movements 
– National Liberation Movements - was not, as is so often the case today, characterised as 
‘terrorism’.23 
Until 1977, when two Additional Protocols were promulgated (AP I and AP II), there was no 
successful attempt to update the rules of conduct of hostilities from those contained in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 so as to take account of use of force in the cause of self-
determination, as Hampson and Salama point out24. They suggest that ‘this may have been 
partly attributable to the reluctance, after both the first and second world wars, to regulate a 
phenomenon which the League of Nations and later the United Nations were intended to 
eliminate or control.’25 However, this is to downplay the significance of the Protocols.  
It is of course the case, that, as they note, AP I dealt with international armed conflicts, up-
dating provisions on the wounded and sick, and formulating rules on the conduct of hostilities, 
while AP II dealt, for the first time, with high-intensity non-international armed conflicts. In 
this, they follow Doswald-Beck and Vité, in whose view the most important contribution of AP 
I ‘is the careful delimitation of what can be done during hostilities in order to spare civilians as 
                                                 
20 See the key collection, which awakened my own interest in international law, J Crawford (ed) The Rights of 
Peoples (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988); and Chapter 1 “Self-determination – the revolutionary kernel of 
international law”, pp.9-38 in Bowring (2008) ibid 
21 UN General Assembly Res 1514(XV) (14 December 1960). 
22 See the excellent analysis of the legal issues, J Faundez, ‘International Law and Wars of National Liberation: Use 
of Force and Intervention’ (1989) 1 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 85; HA Wilson,  
International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990) 
23 See G Andreopoulos “The Age of National Liberation Movements” in Howard et al 1994 (ibid). pp.191-213; and 
B Bowring “Positivism versus self-determination: the contradictions of Soviet international law” in Susan Marks 
(editor) International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), pp.133-168 
24 For a useful brief summary of the history of IHL see note 16 in Hampson & Salama, n 4, at 25-6. 
25 Hampson & Salama, n 4, fn 16, at 26. 
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much as possible.’26  However, of a number of scholars recently publishing on the tension (or 
clash) between IHR and IHL, only William Abresch recognises that the Additional Protocols 
aimed to extend the reach of the existing treaties governing international conflicts to internal 
conflicts: ‘thus, Protocol I deemed struggles for national liberation to be international 
conflicts’27.  In other words, if an armed conflict is a struggle for national liberation against 
‘alien occupation’ or ‘colonial domination’ it is considered an ‘international armed conflict’ 
falling within AP I.28  
This, I suggest, is the key to understanding the significance of both Additional Protocols. They 
were the response of the ICRC, and then the overwhelming majority of states which have 
ratified the Protocols, to the new world of ‘internationalised’ internal conflicts, in the context of 
armed struggle for self-determination by National Liberation Movements. In this way the 
international legal recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination impacted directly on 
IHL. 
How contemporary scholars deal with these differences 
The heretical nature of my contention may be highlighted by an examination of the writings of a 
number of contemporary scholars, exercised in various ways by the relationship between IHL 
and IHR. 
I suggest that the differences I outlined above are much more profound than the differences 
proposed, for example, by William Schabas in his recent article.29 Schabas submits that the lex 
specialis and “belt and suspenders” (that IHL and IHR are additive in nature) approaches “are 
predicated on the idea that there is a fundamental compatibility between the two systems.” On 
the contrary, he argues, these two theories “overlook a fundamental difference in conception 
between the two systems, namely the attitude they take to aggressive war.”30 He points out that 
IHL is predicated on an indifference to the origin of the conflict, whereas IHR “has suggestions 
within it, albeit hesitant and underdeveloped, that aggressive war is itself a violation.” This he 
terms a “human right to peace.” 
                                                 
26 L Doswald-Beck, and S Vité, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ n 293 (1993) 
International Review of the Red Cross 94-119, at 9. 
27 W Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Chechnya’ (2005) 16 EJIL 741, 742. 
28 Additional Protocol I, Article 1(4), and see Abresch, n 38, at 753. 
29 William Schabas “Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the 
Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum” (2007) v.40 Israel Law Review Special Issue: 
Parallel Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, pp.592-613 
30 Schabas, ibid, p.593 
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That is a persuasive argument, and contains a degree of truth. Schabas is right: IHL presumes 
that armed conflict is taking place, and for that reason expects that there will be civilian 
casualties when force is used. Of course, civilians may not be directly targeted.  
This aspect of IHL is well illustrated by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
This creates war crimes of “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such 
or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities”31, and “intentionally directing 
attacks against civilian objects”32. But the intentional launching of an attack “in the knowledge 
that incidental loss of life or injury to civilians…” (which includes an attack launched by a 
reckless perpetrator33) is only a war crime where such loss of life or injury is “clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” This has been explained, 
for example in the Australian military manual, as “so excessive as to clearly indicate wilful 
intent or wanton disregard for the safety of the civilian population.”34 
Thus, in order to convict a military officer or indeed a political leader of the respective war 
crimes the prosecutor must be able to prove a high degree of recklessness. This is in practice 
extremely difficult: the tendency will be always to pay deference to the judgment of responsible 
commanders.  
The IHR regime is quite different. The presumption is that the State will take the utmost care to 
protect the lives of civilians. In order to benefit from the derogations in Article 2 (right to life) of 
the ECHR, the State has the heavy burden of proving that the use of force was “no more than 
absolutely necessary” in “action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.”35 Thus, in Isayeva, the Court concluded as follows: 
“The Court considers that using this kind of weapon in a populated area, outside wartime and without prior 
evacuation of the civilians, is impossible to reconcile with the degree of caution expected from a law-
enforcement body in a democratic society… The massive use of indiscriminate weapons stands in flagrant 
contrast with this aim and cannot be considered compatible with the standard of care prerequisite to an 
operation of this kind involving the use of lethal force by State agents”36. 
In spite of the evidence that the military became aware that civilians were attempting to leave 
the village to escape from the fighting, the Court found that “no document or statement by the 
                                                 
31 Article 8(2)(b)(i), p.130 in K Dörmann and others Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
32 Article 8(2)(b)(ii), p.148 in Dörmann et al, (2003) ibid. 
33 See Dörmann et al, (2003) ibid p.165: “… there seemed to be agreement between States that this.. should not lead 
to the result of exonerating a reckless perpetrator who knows perfectly well the anticipated military advantage and 
the expected incidental damage or injury, but gives no thought to evaluating the possible excessiveness of the 
incidental injury or damage.” 
34 Dörmann et al (2003) ibid, p.172 
35 Article 2(2)(c) 
36 Isayeva v Russia., para. 191. 
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military refers to an order to stop the attack or to reduce its intensity”37. It also rejected the 
finding of the Russian Government military experts' report of 11 February 2002 that the actions 
of the operational command corps were legitimate and proportionate to the situation38. 
The outcome could not have been more different than that which could have been achieved 
under IHL. The State failed to discharge the burden placed on it by the standards and principles 
of IHR. This result was not the product of the application of even an implied “human rights to 
peace”. This great achievement of the French and American Revolutions has the effect of 
placing real limitations on what a State can do in peacetime. And in order to benefit from thee 
existence of a state of war, the Russian State would have had to derogate from the ECHR 
pursuant to Article 15 of the ECHR; and the derogation itself may be challenged in the 
ECtHR.39 
Similarly, I contend that my account has far more substance than the account usually given by 
contemporary scholars of the difference between IHR and IHL. Take for example that provided 
by Cordula Droege, a Legal Adviser in the ICRC.40 
She asserts that “Modern human rights can be traced back to the visionaries of the 
Enlightenment who sought a more just relationship between the state and its citizens.” Tom 
Paine was I think a bit more radical, as was Robespierre. I suggest that such a formulation 
neglects entirely the Battle of Yorktown in 1781 or the storming of the Bastille in 1789. 
Robespierre famously declared that "If the spring of popular government in time of peace is 
virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, 
without which terror is fatal: terror, without which virtue is powerless."41 
For Droege, “Humanitarian law, for its part, was primarily based on the reciprocal expectations 
of two parties at war and notions of chivalrous and civilised behaviour. It did not emanate from 
a struggle of rights-claimants, but from a principle of charity – “inter arma caritas”.” This is 
better – but was it not the case when Cromwell confronted the defenders of Drogheda in 1649, 
that the contemporary laws of war were clear: if surrender was refused and a garrison was taken 
by an assault, then the lives of its defenders would be forfeit? Geoffrey Parker cites Henry V’s 
                                                 
37 Ibid.,  para. 196. 
38 Ibid.,  para. 198. 
39 See Brannigan and McBride v UK , App Nos. 14553/89 ; 14554/89, judgment of 26 May 1993 
40 Cordula Droege “The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in 
Situations of Armed Conflict.” (2007) v.40 Israel Law Review Special Issue: Parallel Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, pp.310-355 
41 See Slavoj Zizek (ed) (2007) Virtue and Justice: Maximilien Robespierre (London:Verso); and for an analysis of 
American revolutionary thought, Michael Hardt (ed) (2007) The Declaration of Independence (London: Verso) 
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brutal speech to the besieged burghers of Harfleur in the 1590s as imagined by Shakespeare42, 
and notes that this remained true in the 18th century. The Duke of Wellington wrote later that “I 
believe it has always been understood that the defenders of a fortress stormed have no claim to 
quarter.”43 This is hardly a principle of charity; or was at least a yawning exception to it. 
Droege goes on: “Considerations of military strategy and reciprocity have historically been 
central to its development. And while human rights were an internal affair of states, 
humanitarian law, by its very nature, took its roots in the relation between states, in international 
law.” This gets much closer to the heart of the matter. 
Is there a “new merger” between IHL and IHR? The Chechen cases again 
More recently, Noelle Quenivet (whose PhD supervisor was Francoise Hampson) has co-edited 
a book suggesting that there is a “new merger” between IHL and IHR.44 As Quenivet puts it in 
her introduction: “At the heart of the enquiry is whether the two bodies of law, IHL and IHR 
have finally merged into a single set of laws.”45 
She cites with approval Cerna’s remark46 that IHL “evolved as a result of humanity’s concerns 
for the victims of war, whereas human rights law evolved as a result of humanity’s concern for 
the victims of a new kind of internal war – the victims of a new kind of internal war – the 
victims of Nazi death camps.” It will be plain from my remarks above that, pace Cerna, this is as 
far from what actually happened as could be the case. I repeat that laws and customs of war have 
accompanied the use of armed force since the beginning of history, while human rights are 
much more recent, but pre-existed the Holocaust. 
In her own chapter in her collection, commenting on the Chechen cases, Quenivet asserts that 
the Strasbourg Court “never assessed whether military operations conducted by state authorities 
were carried out in order to gain a military advantage. This is certainly linked to the fact that the 
very notion of military advantage is one encapsulated in IHL, and is therefore beyond the legal 
                                                 
42 Henry V act 3, scene 3, lines 7-18 
43 See Geoffrey Parker “Early Modern Europe” in  M. Howard et al (eds) (1994) ibid  Chapter 4, pp.40-58, p.48, 
citing Wellington to Geoffrey Canning, 3 February 1820 in Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field 
Marshall Arthur, Duke of Wellington (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1973), 1:93 
44 R Arnold and N Quenivet (eds),(2008)  International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New 
Merger in International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 
45 Arnold and Quenivet, (2008) ibid, p.1 
46 In C Cerna “Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Implementation of International Humanitarian Law Norms by 
Regional Intergovernmental Human Rights Bodies” in F Kalshoven and Y Sandoz (eds) Implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law (Brill, 1989), 31, 34 
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remit in which the [Court] assesses violations of the ECHR.”47 She concludes: “Without 
explicitly recognising that it is appraising the compliance of states with the core principles of 
IHL in non-international armed conflicts, the [Court] is in fact referring to the main principles of 
the lex specialis .”48 and further: “What is remarkable is that the Court applies the detailed 
provisions applicable in times of international armed conflict to situations of non-international 
armed conflict.” I hope I have shown in the preceding passages that the Court would very likely 
have reached a quite different result if it had been confronted with applying IHL to individual 
commanders. The ECtHR was able to make the findings of fact it did precisely because it was 
applying different standards within a very different conceptual framework. 
William Abresch on the other hand, believes that the ECtHR has applied the doctrines it has 
developed on the use of force in law enforcement operations 9for example by the police), to 
high intensity conflicts involving large numbers of insurgents, artillery, and aerial 
bombardment.49 He correctly observes that for lawyers trained and practising within IHL the 
law of international armed conflict would be the ideal proper law for internal armed conflict. He 
calls this an ‘internationalizing trajectory’.50 However, he contends that the ECtHR has broken 
from such a trajectory, in order to derive its own rules from the ‘right to life’ enshrined in 
Article 2 of the ECHR. His prognosis is that: 
given the resistance that states have shown to applying humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts, the 
ECtHR’s adaptation of human rights law to this end may prove to be the most promising base for the 
international community to supervise and respond to violent interactions between the state and its 
citizens.51 
He therefore continues to believe that IHL is the proper law to be applied to situations such as 
the Chechen (or the Kurdish) conflicts. 
He is in reality therefore not so far from Hampson, who clearly considers that the Strasbourg 
Court should take IHL into account, and believes that despite the fact that the Court has never 
referred to the applicability of IHL, ‘there is an awareness of the type of analysis that would be 
conducted under IHL.’52 In this she follows the ‘classical’ model of Doswald-Beck and Vité, 
who considered that ‘the obvious advantages of human rights bodies using [IHL] is that [IHL] 
                                                 
47 N Quenivet “The Right to life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” in R Arnold and N 
Quenivet (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New Merger in International 
Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), pp.331-353, 341 
48 N Quenivet, ibid, p.353 
49 W Abresch, ‘A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Chechnya’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 741, at 742. 
50 at 742. 
51 Abresch (2005) ibid at 743. 
52 Hampson & Salama (2005) ibid, at 18 
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will become increasingly known to decision-makers and the public, who, it is hoped, will exert 
increasing pressure to obtain respect for it.’53 Similarly, Aisling Reidy, who was one of the 
lawyers in the Kurdish cases, together with Hampson and the present author54, considered that 
in the Turkish cases the Strasbourg Court was ‘borrowing language from [IHL] when analysing 
the scope of human rights obligations. Such willingness to use humanitarian law concepts is 
encouraging.’55 She too saw this development as ‘certainly welcome in so far as it contributes to 
a stronger framework for the protection of rights.’56 I disagree. I cannot see how the use of the 
alien framework of IHL in such a case would be “encouraging”. 
I can illustrate these points by further reference to the Chechen cases at the European Court of 
Human Rights.57 These were cases brought by individual Chechen “victims” against the Russian 
Federation. There could have been an inter-state case, and perhaps should have been; but this 
would still have been a complaint of violation of individual rights. The Chechen applicants in 
many ways spoke for the whole of their people. Their objective in the proceedings was not to 
obtain monetary compensation. What they wanted was the vindication, at the highest level, of 
the truth of their account of what had happened to them and to the mass of Chechens. At this 
level Russia’s right to sovereign action was at stake.  
One by-product – entirely contingent as it happens – of the judgments in their favour, was the 
naming in the case of Isayeva v Russia, which concerned the indiscriminate bombing of the 
village of Katyr-Yurt in February 200058of senior Russian officers, General Shamanov and 
General Nedobitko, in the context of findings of fact which amount to the commission of war 
crimes. That places their investigation with a view to prosecution firmly on the agenda. In their 
submissions to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on compliance with the 
judgments in October 200559, the applicants argued that “these two officers were found to have 
been responsible for a military operation which involved the “massive use of indiscriminate 
weapons” and which led, inter alia, to the loss of civilian lives and which has been found to 
have violated Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicants submit 
                                                 
53 L Doswald-Beck, and S Vité, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ n 293 (1993) 
International Review of the Red Cross 94-119 at 108. 
54 See B Bowring (1996) “The Kurds of Turkey: Protecting the Rights of a Minority” in Kirsten Schulze, Martin 
Stokes, Colm Campbell (eds) Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East 
(London: I. B. Tauris) 
55 A Reidy, ‘The approach of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights to international humanitarian 
law’ (1998) International Review of the Red Cross 513, at 521. 
56 Ibid at 521.  
57 References for the first six cases are given above 
58 App no 57950/00 
59 See http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/library/i81669_24.doc; and for the process of enforcement of the Chechen 
judgments as a whole, see http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research-units/hrsj/affiliated-centres/ehrac/ehrac-
litigation/chechnya---echr-litigation-and-enforcement/enforcement-of-chechen-judgments.cfm 
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that in the light of the Court’s findings…, criminal proceedings should be opened in respect of 
both of them.”60  
Moreover, the successful – in my view – application of IHR to internal armed conflict gives the 
lie to Greenwood’s judgment that war is “far too complex and brutal a phenomenon to be 
capable of being constrained by rules designed for peacetime.”61 
Finally, I turn to the recent work of Alexander Orakhelashvili.62 He notes “interdependence” of 
IHR and IHL as explained by the ICJ in the Wall case, and “parallelism” as displayed in the 
Congo-Uganda case. He cites the Kunarac case for the proposition that IHR and IHL are 
“mutually complementary”63 and that “their use for ascertaining each other’s content and scope 
is both appropriate and inevitable.”64  
He comments in detail on the first six Chechen cases65, and concludes that “the European 
Court’s approach allows it to secure the legal outcome required under both human rights law 
and humanitarian law, even though it does not directly apply the provisions of the latter body of 
law, as norms falling outside its competence.”66 This, I respectfully submit, is quite wrong. I 
have sought to show above that the defendant(s), the burden and standard of proof , and the 
evidential issues, would have been quite different had IHL been the proper body of law for these 
cases.  
His conclusion, with which I also disagree, is that “the Court’s approach should be based, as it 
mostly is, on the implicit application of the standards of humanitarian law, albeit cloaked in the 
Convention-specific categories of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality.”67 I return to the 
metaphor of chalk and cheese: these categories have an entirely different origin and content 
from those of IHL. 
Conclusion 
As I signalled in my introduction, it is my view that the European Court of Human Rights has in 
this matter at least, consciously or not, chosen the correct path in dealing with cases which have 
                                                 
60 At paras 28 to 31, and 36 to 40 
61 C Greenwood “Rights at the Frontier: Protecting the Individual in Time of War” in B Rider (ed) Law at the 
Centre (Kluwer Law International 1999) p.277, 293 
62 A Orakhelashvili “(2008) The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, 
Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?”v.19 n.1 European Journal of International Law 161-182; and A 
Orakhelashvili “The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: A Case of Fragmentation” 
International Law and Justice Colloquium, New York University, 26 February 2007, at 
iilj.org/research/documents/orakhelashvili.pdf 
63 IT-96-23-T; Judgment of 22 February 2001, para 467 
64 Orakhelashvili (2008) ibid, p.164 
65 At pp.170-174 
66 Orakhelashvili (2008) ibid, p.174 
67 Orakhelashvili (2008) ibid, p.174 
 14
                                                
come before it, especially the Chechen cases. Of course, the Court is of course perfectly capable 
of dramatic wrong turnings, as when it mistakenly eliminated the content of democracy in 
Zdanoka v Latvia68 or helped to create in Kosovo, through its judgments in Behrami and 
Saramati “a legal black hole over which there is no independent human rights supervision.”69 
Part of the problem is that the ECtHR has only a limited understanding of the historical 
significance of the body of law upon which it adjudicates. But if I am right as to the specificity 
and revolutionary content of IHR, then perhaps it is the law itself which ensures that the ECtHR, 
in some of its judgments at least, is capable of rising to the occasion. 










68 See B Bowring “Negating Pluralist Democracy: The European Court Of Human Rights Forgets the Rights of the 
Electors” (2007) 11 KHRP Legal Review pp.67-96, at http://www.bbk.ac.uk/law/about/ft-
academic/bowring/negatingpluralistdemocracy   
69 See M Milanovic and T Papic “As Bad As It Gets: The European Court’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and 
General International Law” (2009) v.58 pt.2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly pp.267-296, at 295 
